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I. Introduction: WTO Multilateral Framework on Competition Policy  
 
Competition policy deals with principles and laws designed to facilitate competition, 
essentially by preventing anti-competitive conducts. Its objectives are founded in the basic notion 
that increased competition in the market fosters better outcomes for consumers, in terms of 
efficiency, quality and resource allocation. Trade policy also regulates international trade to 
enhance economic efficiency and consumer welfare, mainly through free trade and market 
liberalization.2 The interaction between these two distinct yet similar policies has led to 
discussions at various international organizations including but not limited to the OECD and the 
UNCTAD.3
Interaction between trade and competition policy became one of the WTO issues at the 
1999 Singapore Ministerial Conference, for it was believed that anti-competitive practices, 
private or public, undermined the gains of trade liberalization achieved by the WTO. This 
Ministerial Conference established the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade 
and Competition Policy (WGTCP) to discuss the issues of interaction at a theoretic level. And at 
the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001, it was recognized that a multilateral framework 
on competition policy could enhance the contribution of competition policy to international trade 
? Visiting Researcher, Harvard Law School; Ph.D Candidate, Seoul National University; LL.M. New York 
University, 2005
2 WTO, Report of the WGTCP to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/2, ¶¶ 22-23,1998. 
3 SEUNG WHA CHANG, Interaction Between Trade and Competition: Why a Multilateral Approach for the 
United States, 14 Duke J. of Comp. & Int'l L. 1, pp. 7-10, 2003. 
2and development.4 In essence, the Declaration provided that negotiations will commence after 
the Fifth Ministerial Conference, subject to a decision on modalities of negotiations.5 In addition, 
it authorized the WGTCP to work on the clarification of core principles, including transparency, 
non-discrimination and procedural fairness, and provisions on hard-core cartels; modalities for 
voluntary cooperation; and support for progressive reinforcement of competition institutions in 
developing countries through capacity building.6
Regarding a multilateral framework on competition policy, several developing countries 
had expressed opposition even before the Doha Ministerial Conference. They argued that such an 
approach would be controversial, if not unhelpful.7 India stated that instead of developing 
multilateral rules, the WGTCP should continue to study this issue because the issues at stake is 
too complex and understanding on it by WTO members are far from agreement.8 Brazil argued 
that there is a need to consider the different levels of development; the different cultural context 
4 WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(01)/Dec/1), Paragraph 23 states: 
“Recognizing the case for a multilateral framework to enhance the contribution of competition 
policy to international trade and development, and the need for enhanced technical assistance and 
capacity-building in this area as referred to in paragraph 24, we agree the negotiations will take 
place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, 
by explicit consensus, at that session on modalities of negotiations.” 
This paragraph represented a compromise between WTO Members that desired an immediate launch of 
negotiations on trade and competition policy and those desiring that work on this subject would continue in 
a non-negotiating or educational mode. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at ¶ 25. 
“In the period until the Fifth Session, further work in the Working Group on the Interaction 
between Trade and Competition Policy will focus on the clarification of: core principles, including 
transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness, and provisions on hardcore cartels; 
modalities for voluntary cooperation; and support for progressive reinforcement of competition 
institutions in developing countries through capacity-building. Full account shall be taken of the 
needs of developing and least-developed country participants and appropriate flexibility provided 
to address them.” 
7 WTO, Report on the WGTCP Meeting 2-3 October, WT/WGTCP/M/12, ¶ 35, 2000. India argued “(i)t is 
not at all necessary to have a basic framework of multilateral rules to ensure WTO objectives are 
achieved.” See also AJIT SINGH, Multilateral Competition Policy and Economic Development: A 
Developing Country Perspective on the EC Proposal presented at the 5th Session of the Intergovernmental 
Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy at Geneva, p. 2, 2003. 
8 WTO, Report on the WGTCP Meeting of 19-20 April, WT/WGTCP/M/8, ¶ 20, 1999. India argued “(t)he 
WGTCP was in an exploratory and educative process and was still a long way off from the point where it 
could be in a position to gauge the need for multilateral rules.” 
3in which these regimes will be implemented; the difference in availability of resources for this 
purpose; and the different levels of institutional development.9 Paragraph 24 of the Doha 
Declaration, which emphasized the developing countries’ need for enhanced level of technical 
assistance and capacity building, and paragraph 25, which stated that full account should be taken 
of the needs of developing countries and that flexibility should be provided to them were 
responses to such concerns.10 
After the Doha Ministerial Conference, the WGTCP made substantial progress regarding 
the nature of the linkage between trade, competition and development. The primary objectives of 
the WGTCP were to foster economic development, recognizing that competition policy can be the 
servant of industrial policy; to promote global economic efficiency and consumer benefits; to 
increase the presence of active competition authorities in all markets and enhance voluntary 
cooperation among these authorities; and finally, to maintain a high degree of national 
independence in administering competition policy. 11  However, developing countries had 
continuously expressed opposition to such a multilateral approach.12 
As mandated by the Doha Declaration, Ministers were to decide by explicit consensus on 
modalities of negotiations on a multilateral framework on competition at Cancun in 2003. 
However, a bargaining impasse between the developed and developing members resulted in a 
failure to reach an agreement. The US and EU were not willing to give a sufficient package in 
9 WTO, supra note 6, ¶ 38. 
10 Supra note 3, ¶ 24, 25. Paragraph 24 states: 
“We recognize the needs of developing and least-developed countries for enhanced support for 
technical assistance and capacity-building in this area, including policy analysis and development 
so that they may better evaluate the implications of closer multilateral cooperation for their 
development policies and objectives, and human and institutional development. To this end, we 
shall work in cooperation with other relevant intergovernmental organizations, including 
UNCTAD, and through appropriate regional and bilateral channels, to provide strengthened and 
adequately resourced assistance to respond to these needs.” 
11 ALAN WOLFF, Launching Competition Policy Negotiations in the WTO: Relevant Considerations,
Global Business Dialogue at the Cancun WTO Ministerial September, 2003. 
12 See, e.g., WTO WGTCP, Communication from Colombia, WT/WGTCP/W/162, ¶¶ 3-6, 9-12, 2001. 
4ratcheting down their agricultural subsidies and thus could not strongly argue for the framework 
on competition policy. The whole Cancun package had collapsed. The EC, the strongest 
proponent for a multilateral approach, gave up its single undertaking approach in the WTO and 
decided to take a plurilateral approach.13 As a result, competition along with the other Singapore 
issues were removed from the negotiation tables last July. At present, almost all progress that had 
been made to negotiate a multilateral framework on competition has been suspended. 
 The essential argument of this paper is that a multilateral framework on competition 
policy benefits the developing countries by promoting their economic development. Section II of 
this paper will briefly introduces the multilateral framework, proposed mainly by the EC at the 
WGTCP (hereinafter “Proposed Framework”). Then it will go on to outline the developing 
countries’ opposing positions and refute that the concerns are not as significant as they argue. 
Section III will recapitulate why a WTO multilateral framework on competition is beneficial to 
the developing countries’ developmental needs. Section IV will go on to suggest some possible 
development-oriented revisions to the Proposed Framework. Section V will conclude by urging 
“developing countries” to take a courageous yet wise step towards reengaging in negotiations for 
a multilateral framework on competition policy.  
 
II. Proposed Framework, Oppositions and Counterarguments 
 
1. The Proposed Framework
What the Havana Charter had tried to achieve on the subject of restrictive business 
13 EC COMMISSION, Reviving the DDA Negotiations, Communication from the Commission to the Council, 
To the European Parliament, and to the Economic and Social Committee, p. 2, 2003. In this 
Communication, the EC Commission also stated that this was the only way to develop rules on Singapore 
issues because not all Members were ready to take the step now or in the future. 
5practices is definitely not the goal of discussions at the WGTCP.14 The Proposed Framework 
basically consists of two features: ban on hardcore cartels15 and conformity of domestic 
competition laws with the core WTO principles. The Proposed Framework requires every WTO 
member to have measures prohibiting hardcore cartels. But the members are given the autonomy 
to include certain provisions or exemptions into their competition regime.16 The only condition is 
that they meet certain WTO principles of MFN, non-discrimination, national treatment, 
transparency and procedural fairness. The members must also establish a mechanism for 
mandatory consultation and cooperation on hardcore cartels but cooperation on other matters 
would be voluntary. A WTO Competition Policy Committee would be established to monitor a 
future agreement, assist cooperation, conduct peer reviews and facilitate exchanges of 
information.17 An integrated approach to technical assistance and capacity building can also be 
provided for the developing countries.  
 This Proposed Framework is undoubtedly “modest” compared to those proposed earlier 
in the discussion.18 It does not advocate WTO members to adopt a full set of competition laws. 
14 Article 46 (1) of the Havana Charter states as follows: 
“Each Member shall take appropriate measures and shall cooperate with the Organization to 
prevent, on the part of private or public commercial enterprises, business practices affecting 
international trade which restrain competition, limit access to markets, or foster monopolistic 
control, whenever such practices have harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade and 
interfere with the achievement of any of the other objectives set forth in Article 1.” 
15 The OECD defines hard-core cartels as anticompetitive agreements, anticompetitive concerted practices 
or anticompetitive arrangements by competitors “to fix prices, make rigged bids (collusive tenders), 
establish output restrictions or quotas, or share or divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, 
territories or lines of commerce.” OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action 
Against Hard Core Cartels, 1998. 
16 For a general overview see WTO WGTCP, Communication from the European Community and its 
Member States, WT/WGTCP/W/184, 2002. 
17 For a more detailed description of the proposal, see WTO WGTCP, Communication from the European 
Community and its Member States, Dispute Settlement and Peer Review: Options for a WTO Agreement on 
Competition Policy, WT/WGTCP/W/229, 2003. 
18 For a historical survey of international debates on international competition law/policy, see ELEANOR M. 
FOX, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 911, pp 925-932, 2003; CHANG, supra 
note 2, pp. 14-20. 
6Instead, it only involves a minimum set of reasonable rules.19 It does not aim at a comprehensive 
harmonization of domestic competition laws, but takes into consideration the peculiarities of 
national circumstances.20 It is framed in terms of adherence to certain core principles that 
embody fundamental values of both competition policy and the multilateral trading system. It 
deliberately leaves broad scope for continuing adaptation of national approaches to competition 
policy in response to economic learning and national circumstances. It is a response to the key 
concerns raised by critics of a multilateral approach in the WTO,21 and seems to be in harmony 
with the developmental interests.22 
2. Developing Countries Oppositions and Counterarguments 
Although the discussion at the WGTCP may seem to have been based on a consensus for 
a multilateral framework on competition policy, it was not. Countries had continuously expressed 
oppositions. The basic foundation of such opposition is that there is no consensus on the 
robustness of the link between trade and competition and on whether that linkage is strong 
enough to call for a multilateral competition policy.23 Responding to such a theoretic question is 
out of the scope of this paper. This paper only focuses on those contrasting opinions from the 
developing country perspectives. 
 
1) One-Size-Fits-All Approach 
Very few developing countries have competition laws. Many of the least-developing 
19 Singh, supra note 6, p.10. 
20 IGNACIO GARCIA-BERCERO AND STEFAN AMARASINHA, Moving the Trade and Competition Debate 
Forward, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, pp. 481-506, 2001. See also WTO WGTCP, 
Communication from the European Community and its Member States, WT/WGTCP/W/222, 2002. 
21 DANIEL K. TARULLO, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, vol. 94, no. 3, July, pp. 478-504, 2000. 
22 Singh, supra note 6, p. 25. 
23 Id., p. 6. 
7countries have no legislation at all. Most of the 90 or so developing countries, which now have 
competition laws, enacted their laws only during the 1990s.24 Moreover, even among those 
countries that have competition law, the content and enforcement of those laws differ, depending 
on economic resources and institutional capacity. Thus, it is argued that an appropriate 
competition policy has to differ between countries depending on their level of development, on 
the state of their governance and many other factors.25 The main concern is based on the belief 
that the Proposed Framework pursues a one-size-fits-all approach and not a case-by-case 
approach. 
But as the Chairman of the WGTCP stated in Cancun, the Proposed Framework does not 
inhibit the development of national approaches to competition policy in line with national 
circumstances.26 The Proposed Framework is not based on a one-size-fits-all approach. It merely 
asks Members to adopt the core principles of the WTO to their competition regime. The 
“multilateral” approach should be distinguished from the more extreme “uniform” approach, 
which pursues a single global antitrust law. 
 
2) Burden on Developing Countries  
 Developing countries have also argued that not of them have the capacity to implement 
competition laws. In order for competition policy to become effective, it takes time, perhaps even 
decades for the appropriate social and legal culture of competition and competition policy to 
evolve. Before serious enforcement can proceed, much learning must occur and political support 
24 Of the 38 jurisdictions that enacted competition laws in the 1990s, 27 were developing countries. SIMON 
J. EVENETT, Links Between Development and Competition Law in Developing Countries, Case Studies for 
the World Development Report, 2005; see also INVESTMENT CLIMATE, Growth and Property, 2003. 
25 See, e.g., WTO WGTCP, Report on the WGTCP Meeting of 10-11 June 1999, WT/WGTCP/M/9, ¶¶ 30-
31, 1999. 
26 ROBERT ANDERSON AND FREDERIC JENNY, The Current Proposals for WTO Negotiations on Competition 
Policy: Background and Overview, 2003. 
8must be built.27 Developing countries will also have the burden of adjustment costs caused by 
new regulations and enforcement mechanisms.28 Thus, the argument that developing countries 
lack the resources and experience to fully participate meaningfully in a multilateral competition 
policy sounds convincing. In a submission to the WGTCP, Thailand had stressed the financial 
constraints and argued that competition agencies in developing countries need to be financially 
compensated and should be allowed to cooperate to the extent possible subject to technical and 
financial constraints.29 
The Proposed Framework does not bind the developing countries to these constraints. It 
realizes that imposing such obligation in unrealistic and would be burdensome on the developing 
countries. By inserting provisions for technical assistance and capacity building, the seemingly 
heavy burden on developing countries is shared among the members, especially with developed 
countries. Detailed modalities must go through a negotiation process, which is currently 
impossible.  
 In fact, the developing countries fears regarding excessive implementation costs might be 
too exaggerated.30 The ultimate test of the effectiveness of competition policy in developing 
countries would have to consider the beneficial impacts compared to the cost of implementation. 
Competition policy can bring important benefits to the poor, but careful attention must be paid to 
avoid over-elaborate institutions.31 Although a few case studies cannot generalize the cost-
benefits analysis, the case of Peru shows a good example that benefits exceed the implementation 
27 F.M. SCHERER, International Trade and Competition Policy, Harvard University, p. 18, 1996. 
28 MYRIAM VANDER STICHELE, What is Wrong with Competition Negotiations in the WTO? The Problems 
of a Competition Policy Agreement in the WTO in Investment and Competition Negotiations in the WTO – 
What’s Wrong with it and What are the Alternatives?, Seattle to Brussels Network, 2002. (available at 
http://www.s2bnetwork.org)
29 WTO WGTCP, Communication from Thailand, WT/WGTCP/W/213, ¶ 6, 2002. 
30  S.J. EVENETT, Interim Report on the Issues Relating to a Possible Multilateral Framework on 
Competition Policy, WGTCP, 2003. 
31 N. MCCULLOCH, L.A. WINTERS AND X. CIRERA, TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND POVERTY: A HANDBOOK,
CEPR, 2001. 
9costs. In the first few years of Peruvian Competition Agency, Indecopi’s operation (1993-1996), 
the economic benefits arising from intensification of competition amounted to $ 120 million 
against operating costs of $20 million.32 The heads of the competition agencies of Zambia, 
Gabon and South Africa also provided positive assessments of their experience.33 Of course, this 
does not necessarily mean that high implementation costs are irrelevant or unimportant. For the 
least-developed countries, it would be of more significance.34 
3) Limitation of Developing Countries Policy Options 
 Developing countries also argue that a multilateral approach would limit the policy 
options of developing countries when they pursue economic development; in short, it harms the 
policy autonomy of the developing countries. As mentioned, developing countries vary and for 
many of them other policies such as industrial policy may play a more useful role than 
competition policy in their pursuit for economic development.35 Competition might need to be 
restricted in order to achieve economic efficiency. Some anti-competitive practices might need to 
be permitted to target other development goals or to achieve economies of scale. Developing 
countries might want to protect small or mid-sized companies and infant industries that have to 
compete against large multinationals with far better access to finance or global marketing 
networks. In fact, some developing countries that are far from an ideal world for competition, 
where the basic concept of market is not even understood, might be better off with no competition 
32 A. CACERES, Indecopi's First Seven Years , B.Boza, 2000. 
33  WTO SECRETARIAT, Report on WTO Regional Workshop on Competition Policy, Economic 
Development and the Multilateral Trading System, 2000. 
34 Id. 
35 A.H. AMSDEN, The Rise of “The Rest”–Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies.,  
Oxford University Press, p. 78 2001; AJIT SINGH AND R. DHUMALE Competition Policy, Development, and 
Developing Countries in ARESTIS P., M. BADDELEY, AND J. MCCOMBIE (eds.) What Global Economic 
Crisis? Palgrave. pp 122-145, 2001. 
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policy at all.36
If, indeed, the Proposed Framework goes to the extreme and fosters homogenization of 
competition policy objectives among WTO members, it would deprive the developing countries 
of very important developmental instruments.37 Simply adopting the US or EU competition law 
would also be far from helpful in assisting the economic development of developing countries.38 
The Proposed Framework does not designate what the objectives of competition law or policy 
should be. There has actually been a considerable debate about what the goals of competition law 
should be. And it is generally accepted in developed countries that the goal is to enhance the static 
and dynamic efficiency of the economy by altering the allocation of resources.39 Dynamic 
efficiency may also be emphasized as the central element in consideration of competition policy 
for developing countries.40 But under the Proposed Framework, developing countries are able to 
choose whatever policy, a good industrial or a socio-political policy that they feel necessary. 
Developing countries may pursue other non-efficiency-based economic objectives or even non-
economic objectives. South Africa’s competition law, which lists six objectives for its 1998 
Competition Act including the promotion of a greater spread of ownership, in particular, to 
increase the ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons, is one good example. 
Developing countries will not be hindered from their competition policy objectives.  
 
4) Concerns Regarding Market Access  
 Although, it was decided that market access would not be the focus of discussions at the 
36  J.J. LAFFONT, Competition, Information, and Development, Annual World Bank Conference on 
Development Economics, pp.237-257, 1998. 
37 SINGH, Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging Markets: International and Developmental 
Dimensions, Economic Journal, p. 31. 
38 SINGH AND DHUMALE, supra note 31.
39 R. POSNER, Antitrust in the New Economy, ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL, pp. 31-33, 2001. 
40 D. AUDRETSCH,, W. BAUMOL AND A. BURKE, Competition Policy in Dynamic Markets, INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, Vol.19, No.5, pp. 613-634, 2001. 
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WGTCP, market access issues were a concern of the developing countries. Worries had been 
expressed that excessive emphasis on market access objectives could distort the principles of 
competition policy and also be detrimental to the interests of developing countries.41 This is 
because the developed countries had asserted that obstacles to market access, which are prevalent 
in developing countries, are in clear breach of competition principles and should therefore be the 
subject of greater scrutiny.42 The market access debate reflects most distinctly the divide between 
those Members wishing to pursue direct negotiations on competition policy and those who do 
not.43 
The focus of the Proposed Framework has shifted from one of securing market access to 
one promoting the development of effective national competition regimes and expanding 
international cooperation to address anti-competitive practices. The Chairman of the WGTCP in 
Cancun had stated that the Proposed Framework would not give market access objectives a 
privileged position at the expense of more broadly-based goals of competition law and policy 
such as economic efficiency, consumer welfare and economic development. 44  Thus, the 
developing countries don’t need to worry about developed countries utilizing the multilateral 
framework on competition to gain market access to developing countries. 
III. The Rationale for a WTO Multilateral Framework Approach  
 
In Section II, the developing countries oppositions to the Propose Framework and their 
41 TARULLO, supra note 20, p. 121; DIANE WOOD, When is market access really market access?, 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAWYER, vol. 24, no. 10, 1996; WTO WGTCP, Annual Report of the WGTCP 
to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/3, ¶ 13. 
42 ROBERT D. ANDERSON AND PETER HOLMES, Competition policy and the Future of the Multilateral 
Trading System’, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 5, Issue 2, p 539, 2002. 
43 E. M. GRAHAM, “Internationalizing” Competition Policy: An Assessment of the Two Main Alternatives, 
THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN, Vol. 48, Issue 4, pp. 952-953, 2003. 
44 ANDERSON AND JENNY, supra note 25; See also ROBERT D. ANDERSON AND PETER HOLMES, Competition 
Policy and the Future of Multilateral Trading System, Discussion Paper in Economics 84, University of 
Sussex, pp. 19-21, 2002. 
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counterarguments were outlined. This section illustrates why there still exists a strong rationale 
for the developing countries to pursue a WTO multilateral framework, notwithstanding the 
possible drawbacks mentioned above.  
 
1. Competition Policy and Economic Development
One rationale for a multilateral framework on competition policy regards domestic 
considerations. Developing countries recognize that adoption of competition policy could lead to 
efficient allocation of resources, which foster economic development. Although the nature of the 
relationship between competition and development is somewhat unclear,45 studies show that 
competition enhances dynamic economic performances.46 Competition between firms sharpens 
incentives for them to cut costs and to improve productivity. Active enforcement of competition 
laws substantially improves the allocation of resources and plays a direct role in promoting long-
term economic performance.47 
With worldwide deregulation, privatization and liberalization, competition policy also 
plays a complementary role to other trade or market policies. Developing countries now take part 
in liberalizing and integrating its markets to the global economy. But benefits of an open market 
economy cannot be fully realized when restrictions on competition exist.48 A comparative study 
on the role of competition policy showed that developing countries in Africa and South Asia, on 
their move away from protectionism, had integrated competition regimes during the process of 
45 EVENETT, supra note 23; JAMES R. TYBOUT, Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well 
Do They Do, and Why? JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp.11-44, 2000. 
46 WTO WGTCP, Study on Issues Relating To A Possible Multilateral Framework on Competition Policy,
WT/WGTCP/W/228, 2003. As Michael Porter puts it “domestic rivalry not only creates pressures to 
innovate but to innovate in ways that upgrade the competitive advantages of those firms.” 
47 J. L CLARK AND S. J.EVENETT, The Deterrent Effects of National Anti-Cartel Laws: Evidence from the 
International Vitamins Cartel, ANTITRUST BULLETIN, 2002; EVENETT, supra note 23 
48 ADB, Asian Development Outlook 2005, p. 246. 
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promoting vigorous market economies.49 This study also showed that benefits from trade reform, 
deregulation, and privatization cannot be realized without the potential for active and effective 
enforcement of competition law. The case of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan provides similar ideas. 
The existence of vibrant competition agencies in these countries had been an important factor 
contributing to the adoption of open market policies through the agencies’ advocacy function.50 
The importance of such activities and their contribution to the process of economic reform and 
development cannot be stressed heavily enough. 51  Competition policy reinforces and is 
instrumental in the implementation of a range of related economic reforms taken by the 
developing countries in their process to a market economy. Conversely, a failure to implement 
competition policy and related regulatory reforms can prevent countries from realizing the 
potential gains from liberalization.52 
Commitments to a multilateral framework on competition policy allow the developing 
countries to pursue the fundamental goal of economic development. Competition policy, itself, 
complements and reinforces market reforms, i.e. liberalization, privatization and regulatory 
reforms. It is also useful in overcoming protectionist resistance from interest group and thus 
provides momentum for those reforms.53 In other words, international agreements might be able 
to assist developing countries in prevailing over "political market failures" or rent-seeking 
49 CONSUMER UNITY AND TRUST SOCIETY, The 7-Up Project: A Comparative Study of Competition 
Regimes in Select Developing Countries of the Commonwealth, 2001. (available on the internet at 
http://cuts.org/7-up%20project.htm). 
50 WTO WGTCP, Annual Report of the WGTCP to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/2, ¶¶ 34, 45, 109, 
1998. 
51 Id. at ¶¶ 51, 53. 
52 CHIEDU OSAKWE, Poverty Reduction and Development: The Interaction of Trade,Macroeconomic and 
Regulatory Policies, 2001. 
53 NANCY BIRDSALL AND ROBERT Z. LAURENCE, Deep Integration and Trade Agreements: Good for 
Developing Countries? in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY,
edited by INGE KAUL, ISABELLE GRUNBERG AND MARC A. STERN, Oxford University Press for the United 
Nations Development Programme, p. 136, 1999. 
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activities that reduce welfare and impede development.54 Furthermore, a multilateral agreement 
has the potential to assist governments in implementing policies through promoting the building 
of institutional and enforcement capacity and providing opportunities for international 
cooperation.55 Indeed, the Proposed Framework could play a crucial role in enabling developing 
countries to implement effective policies in this area, by promoting cooperative approaches to 
institution-building and enforcement and by providing a tool for overcoming domestic 
constituencies that might otherwise block the reform process.56 
2. Effective Mechanism to Respond to International Hardcore Cartels 
The main idea of competition policy is to deter and to provide remedies for specific 
abuses such as cartels, monopolies or anti-competitive mergers that raise the price and/or reduce 
the quality and availability of goods and services.57 These conducts are no longer an exclusive 
concern of the developing countries. There is a growing recognition that anti-competitive 
practices impact directly on the welfare and development prospects of developing countries.58 
Hardcore cartels provide a relatively undisputed high-ground for a multilateral 
54 ROBERT D. ANDERSON AND FREDERIC JENNY, Internal Reform as a Necessary Condition for Realizing 
the Benefits of Trade Liberalization: The Case for Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy in THE 
POLICY-RELEVANCE OF MAINSTREAMING TRADE INTO COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES:
PERSPECTIVES OF LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (Report on the Seminar by the Integrated Framework 
Core Agencies, WT/LDC/SWG/IF/15/Rev.1, 2001), pp. 70-77, 2001. 
55 ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, Legal, Economic and Political Objectives of National and International 
Competition Policies: Constitutional Functions of WTO “Linking Principles” for Trade and Competition,
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW, pp. 156, 159, 1999. 
56 See e.g. IGNACIO GARCIA-BERCERO AND STEFAN AMARASINHA, Moving the Trade and Competition 
Debate Forward, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, pp. 481-506, 2000; ANDERSON AND 
HOLMES, supra note 41.
57 ANDERSON AND HOLMES, Id. 
58  FREDERIC JENNY, Globalization, Competition and Trade Policy: Convergence, Duvergence and 
Cooperation in YANG-CHING CHAO GEE SAN, CHANGFA LO AND JIMING HO (eds.), INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW AND POLICIES pp. 31-70, 2001; M. LEVENSTEIN AND V. SUSLOW,
Private International Cartels and Their Effect on Developing Countries, Background Paper for the World 
Bank's World Development Report, 2001. (available at http://www-
unix.oit.umass.edu/~maggiel/WDR2001.pdf). 
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competition policy. In fact, hardcore cartels are widely regarded as the strongest argument 
favoring the intervention of competition policy.59 Korea stated that regulations on cartels should 
be included in the multilateral framework on competition policy, for their negative impacts are 
clear and also significantly affect international trade.60 Studies have indicated that international 
cartels raise the costs of developing countries’ imports from developed countries by billions of 
dollars annually.61 Competition authorities of developing countries are unable to gather enough 
evidence due to lack of resources and experience, even when they acknowledge a cartel. If they 
are unable to obtain cooperation from competition authorities of developed countries, their 
consumers would have to unwillingly bear the high cost incurred by cartels. In the recent Vitamin 
case, developing countries were not able to attain cooperation from developed countries even 
when their importers and consumers were severely hurt.62 At present, there exists no legal 
structure for assisting developing countries. Thailand, in its submission to the WGTCP, 
recognized the potential damage associated with international cartels and the urgent need to 
eradicate these cross-border collusive practices.63 It went on to state that these cartels tend to 
operate in countries with weak enforcement of competition laws and thus supported multilateral 
assistance in providing mutual assistance in fighting these cartels.64 Without a minimum global 
standard for national cartel enforcement, hardcore cartels are likely to target their conspiracies in 
those jurisdictions with no or weak anti-cartel measures, meaning developing countries. 
 Competition policy in the national level is of critical importance. However, it is 
59 S.J. EVENETT, Study on Issues Relating to a Possible Multilateral Framework on Competition Policy, 
WTO WGTCP, WT/WGTCP/W/228. p. 33, 2003. For a more in-depth analysis see M. LEVENSTEIN, V. 
SUSLOW, AND L. OSWALD, International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing Countries: A Discussion of 
Effects and Policy Remedies, Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) University of Massachusetts 
Amherst, Working Paper Series, No. 53, 2003. 
60 WTO WGTCP, Communication from Korea to the WGTCP, WT/WGTCP/W/200, ¶ 4, 2002. 
61 LEVENSTEIN, SUSLOW AND OSWALD, Id. 
62 LEVENSTEIN AND SUSLOW, supra note 57. 
63 WTO WGTCP, Communication from Thailand to WGTCP, WT/WGTCP/W/213, ¶ 1, 2003. 
64 Id. 
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significantly inadequate for certain issues. In a global world like today, developing countries need 
to cooperate with other competition authorities to deal with anti-competitive effects of 
international cartels and mergers that harm their consumers.65 Developing countries are not able 
to protect themselves from these cartels, and harms caused in these counties have a spill-over 
effect on the rest of the world. While developed countries might ease these problems through 
bilateral agreements, developing countries cannot due to the lack of influence or power to obtain 
such cooperation. Bilateral cooperation arrangements are usually entered into by developed 
countries and developing countries are left out of such arrangements.66 For the developing 
countries, they can do nothing else but to endure those anti-competitive practices.  
 The Proposed Framework identifies the importance of international hardcore cartels as a 
distortion of the world trading system and has rightly located two of the policy-related causes of 
sub-optimal levels of enforcement: ineffective or non-existent national cartel enforcement 
regimes and inadequate information exchange. It provides solutions for problems that could not 
be solved through bilateral cooperation. In fact, it assists developing countries in addressing 
hardcore cartels that impose significant costs on their national economies.  
 
3. The WTO, an Appropriate Forum?
Some people, even after realize that it is necessary to take a multilateral approach, argue 
that the WTO is not an appropriate forum for dealing with competition issues. They argue that 
competition policy, a complex undertaking and an enormous challenge, should not be taken by an 
organization already overloaded with other problems. As an alternative, the UNCTAD, which 
65 “Examining these sixteen products -- which were cartelized at some point during the 1990s and for 
which we were able to obtain reasonably reliable trade data -- the total value of such "cartel-affected" 
imports to developing countries was $81.1 billion. This made up 6.7% of all imports to developing 
countries. It is equal to 1.2% of their combined GDP.” from Levenstein and Suslow, supra note 57. 
66 KONRAD VON FINCKENSTEIN, International Antitrust Cooperation: Bilateralism or Multilateralism? 
Canada Competition Bureau (available at http://cb-bc.gc.ca/epic/internet/incb-bc.nsf/en/ct02240e.html#top)
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already has a Set of Principles on Restrictive Business Practices, is suggested. UNCTAD 
currently supports developing countries in designing competition policy rules more suited to 
development needs.67
However, the WTO is a more suitable forum for coordinating worldwide cooperation. A 
multilateral framework on competition within the WTO would give competition authorities of 
developing countries direct access to an extensive network of competition authorities to which 
they could address requests for assistance.68 The WTO is currently the only global economic 
body. That is why nearly all proponents of global antitrust concluded that the appropriate forum 
would logically and practically be the WTO.69 Discussions on the complex issues regarding the 
interaction between trade and competition are also possible. Furthermore, a WTO approach works 
as a building block for integrating developing countries into the trading system.  
 The WTO also provides a forum for exchange of interests. Developing countries may be 
able to obtain other interests by agreeing to adopt the Proposed Framework. As we have seen in 
Cancun, in order to reach a consensus on this issue, developed countries would need to offer 
concessions in other trade areas in exchange for developing countries’ support.70 The fact that 
WTO is the only body that has the breadth of jurisdiction to enable such exchange of interest 
must be given significant importance.  
 
67 MYRIAM VANDER STICHELE, What is wrong with competition negotiations in the WTO?, The problems of 
a competition policy agreement in the WTO in Investment and Competition Negotiations in the WTO – 
What’s wrong with it and what are the alternatives? Seattle to Brussels Network, available at 
http://www.s2bnetwork.org 2002 
68 WTO, Communication from the European Community and its Member States: The Development 
Dimension of Competition Law and Policy, WT/WGTCP/W/140, 2000. 
69 FOX, supra note 17. 
70 ANDREW T. GUZMAN, International Antitrust and the WTO: The Lesson from Intellectual Property,
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 43, p 951, 2003. 
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IV. A Development-Oriented Framework?  
 
Whether developing countries will benefit from negotiations on a multilateral framework 
on competition policy at the WTO will depend on a number of factors and no outcomes can be 
guaranteed. A general cost and benefit analysis will not be persuasive to developing countries for 
the cost and benefit will vary according to their national circumstances. We will also have to wait 
for future negotiations to see how it will benefit the interest of the developing countries. But, it is 
of importance that a multilateral framework will have to respect the core principles of 
competition policy; permit and facilitate their continuing elaboration in response to economic 
learning and other developments; and build positively on the institutional and other strengths of 
such policy. Carefully assessed with particular attention to factors such as implementation costs 
and consistency with development objectives, the Proposed Framework seems to respond to these 
concerns. 
 Notwithstanding the foregoing observation, this paper does not suggest that the 
Proposed Framework necessarily meets all of the concerns that may be raised, in particular by 
developing countries. The fundamental opposition against this Proposed Framework stems from 
the belief that the Framework is not “development-oriented.” Indeed, it is argued that the basic 
concepts used in the discourse at WGTCP are inimical to the interests of developing countries and 
that new definitions and concepts are required to adequately address the concerns of developing 
countries.71 But the Proposed Framework is merely a ‘framework’ not a completed set of 
agreements. Through further discussion and negotiation, the framework can be reframed to focus 
71 SINGH AND DHUMALE, supra note 31; SINGH, Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging 
Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions, ESRS Centre for Business Research, University of 
Cambridge. Working Paper No. 246. December 2002. 
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more on economic development. By adding necessary elements to assist developing countries, a 
multilateral framework on competition policy will complement other national objectives and 
policies of the developing countries. In the following, this paper will suggest some of the 
elements that need to be emphasized to make the framework development-oriented.  
 The first is special and differential treatment, which was also emphasized in the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration.72 This would mean that “development dimensions” will be valid grounds 
for differential treatment for countries with different capacities.73 Negotiations on transitional 
periods, exceptions and exemptions from the multilateral framework will have to be conducted. In 
general, competition policy will be adopted gradually and flexibly suitable to their level of 
development and their development interests and in a way that does not defer the socio-political 
policies. Such a “flexible” and “progressive” approach will allow developing countries more 
autonomy in competition policies.74 In its submission to the WGTCP, Thailand had insisted on 
the inclusion of special and differential treatment for developing countries to the core principles 
of competition policy.75 The EC also stated that least-developed countries and smaller economies 
should be allowed to adopt any new WTO obligations regarding a domestic competition regime in 
a flexible and progressive manner.76 
The second is voluntary cooperation in the development of national legislation and the 
exchange of national experience, in addition to the enforcement process. This would broaden the 
coverage of approaches already in force under existing “soft” cooperation agreements at the 
72 See OECD, The Role of Special and Differential Treatment at the Trade, Competition and Development 
Interface, Joint Group on Trade and Competition, Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs. 
Paris, 2001. 
73 WTO WGTCP, Communication from India, WT/WGTP/W/212, 2002. 
74 Id. 
75 WTO WGTCP, Communication from Thailand, WT/WGTCP/W/216, 2002. 
76 WTO WGTCP, supra note 19.
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bilateral and regional level, to which developing countries are not parties.77
The third is technical assistance and capacity building, which will assume greater 
importance as discussions intensify about the developmental consequences of a credible 
competition policy. Developing economies have raised concerns about the implementation costs 
of potential disciplines regarding competition policy and these concerns have been echoed by 
certain trade policy experts.78 Support for technical assistance and capacity building should be 
emphasized as responding to a key concern of developing countries. This would be effective in 
responding to the concerns based on the developing countries’ perceived lack of institutional 
capacity and experience in this area. and reduce the burden of the developing countries when 
implementing cooperation policies. The inclusion of technical assistance provisions in the Doha 
Declaration was one of the key elements that made it possible for many developing countries to 
accept potential WTO negotiations on competition policy. Future negotiation should tailor 
technical assistance according to the diversity of needs and distinct national conditions of 
developing countries. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Last July, it was decided that no formal negotiations on a multilateral framework on 
competition policy will be held at the WTO for the time being. In the absence of multilateral 
negotiations, developing countries are now free to develop their own competition regime. They 
are also free not to adopt any competition law. But as this paper has argued, developing countries 
should realize the benefits of a multilateral approach and reconsider discussions at the WTO. 
77 ROBERT D. ANDERSON AND FREDERIC JENNY, Current Developments on Competition Policy in the 
World Trade Organization, Antitrust, 2001. 
78 L. A. WINTERS, Doha and the World Poverty Targets, Mimeo. University of Sussex, 2002. 
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 But there is a more pragmatic reason for the developing countries to argue for reviving 
the discussions on a multilateral framework on competition policy. By pushing the competition 
policy as well as other Singapore issues off the off the negotiating table, developing countries 
have actually surrendered an important issues which trade-offs could have been made. Exploiting 
these trade-offs is at the heart of multilateral trade negotiations and the associated give-and-take 
would have allowed the developing countries to maximize there interest. In fact, the developing 
countries could have approached the market access concerns from a different perspective. 
Developing countries could have utilized the multilateral framework on competition and 
negotiations to improve the market access conditions of the developed countries. They could have 
strongly argued that anti-dumping issues would also need to be dealt in the competition context. 
Of course there is no guarantee that EU and US will be willing to make concessions on these 
issues,79 but by including issues of anti-dumping and subsidies in a more comprehensive 
framework on competition, developing countries interests would have been more reflected. 
 Development will be best served if developing countries commit themselves to stronger 
multilateral rules and try to benefit from the commitments made by the developed countries. 
Developing countries could utilize a multilateral approach to best further their individual and 
collective interests.80 And active participation by developing countries could tilt the balance in 
their favor. They could robustly demand that a flexible and progressive approach be taken to all 
commitments, recognizing differences in stage of development, legal and business cultures, and 
the like. They could insist on enhanced capacity-building efforts during the negotiations and not 
after their conclusion. As India stated “developing countries should be ensured that they would 
79 S.J. EVENETT, Can Developing Economies Benefit from WTO Negotiations on Binding Disciplines for 
Hard Core Cartels?, UNCTAD, p. 27-28, 2003. 
80 EVENETT, supra note 78 at p. 31. 
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benefit from international cooperation and capacity-building on competition.81
My paper started out from the belief that a multilateral framework will foster a 
“competition culture” among the developing countries. It was a humble wish met with 
oppositions. I just hope that discussions on a multilateral competition policy at the WTO will not 
be suspended for a long time. The WGTCP should, as least, continue to be a forum for discussion 
on these issues. Without such discussion, the developing countries as well as the developed 
countries will not be able to realize the benefits that a multilateral approach may provide. And 
discussions at the WTO, where more than any other members participate, will have a positive 
effect in expanding “competition culture.” Promotion of consumer benefits, economic efficiency, 
and economic development are worthy goals. The liberalization of world trade that the GATT has 
accomplished over the course of four decades is a primary source of progress toward meeting 
these goals and a possible framework on competition at the WTO will be of help in continuing 
that progress.  
81 WTO WGTCP, supra note 72. 
